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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Treaties have long been the cornerstones of international relations.  
They can be seen as one of the sole mechanisms to formalize agreements between sovereign 
states. In principle, these agreements are legally binding.  In practice, the result is less certain. 
Issues ranging from the how the country views itself on the international stage to the specific 
treaty terms and enforcement mechanisms can all effect prospects for compliance.  What is 
certain is the disruption and uncertainty that noncompliance causes.  If not addressed, a treaty’s 
utility will eventually erode to the point where the agreement has no force. Other countries 
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would also perceive little value in treaty ratification if compliance cannot be sufficiently verified.  
This report focuses on current issues of noncompliance with Russia, Syria, Iran, and North 
Korea.  Key themes arise across these cases and point to specific factors that impact treaty 
compliance.  The report distills these key themes into general and case-specific 
recommendations for bringing a country back from noncompliance. They are: 
 
1. More investment in multilateral treaties…. 
2. Determining the political personality of the nation state in treaties 
3. The difficulties in determining compliance center on the nature of the treaty 
4. Understanding Hard Law versus Soft Law is critical 
5. Finding a common ground for each treaty in non-compliance using energy  
6. Using international organizations to assist in treaty compliance 
7. Using information sharing and transparency to assist in bring compliance 
8. Finding an agreed verification process is critical to treaty compliance  
 
Specific recommendations for each country to return it to compliance are: 
 
Russia: 
1. Stress communication and collaboration among stakeholders, which work to foster trust and 
cooperation as recommended by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) working group.       
2) Expanding bilateral cooperative developments/evaluations with P-5 + 1states;  
3) Extending the development/evaluations to all nuclear weapon states; 
4) Engaging major nations that employ nuclear power generation;  
5) Evolving from bilateral to multilateral implementation;  
6) Engaging in both hard law and soft law. 
Syria: 
1. Recommendation one is to force Syria back into compliance would be to change the leader 
and some of their government. 
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2. The second recommendation to get Syria back into compliance would be to provide long term 
assistance to help internally displaced persons Syrians and refugees. 
3. The third recommendation is to reduce the influence of the loyalists Syria forces and their 
ability to create and obtain biological and chemical weapons by an increase of U.S. influence in 
Syria. 
Iran: 
1. In order to move forward in future negotiations with Iran it is our recommendation that the 
United States remain in compliance with the JCPOA. 
2. Leverage China to assist with curtailment of missile testing and Russia as well, one regarding 
trade incentives and the other concerning additional sanctions. 
3. If sanctions were to be again placed into effect, it is recommended that the United States 
maintain and continue to impose strict sanctions on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Core and 
its top-ranking officials…. 
North Korea: 
 1. It is recommended the U.S. should offer significant economic aid and security assurance if 
North Korea dismantles her nuclear program.   
  2. As a showing of good faith, we recommend that lifting current sanctions/ on: statue, coal, 
mineral, iron, seafood, textile exports, and caps on North Korean labor exports. 
3. Leverage China and Russia to freeze development of the North Korean program via China 
sanctioning coal; and Russia ceasing trading through Vladivostok. 
4. “The most realistic U.S. strategy for countering North Korea's exploitation of geostrategic 
divisions and halting its sprint toward nuclear development is to close the gaps with allies and 
neighbors of North Korea.” 
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5. Lastly, probably the most unlikely and unwanted of the options would be to relent and allow 
North Korea to develop these weapons. 
HYPOTHESIS: While treaty agreements should in no way be seen as monolithic, there can be 
several similar factors which animate treaty formation. The presence of these factors or variables 
impacts the terms and level of compliance of an agreement. How a country perceives the costs 
and benefits of agreement, socio-historical context, as well as characteristics of the treaty itself 
can be used to establish country-specific models of noncompliance. These models can then be 
used to establish roadmaps for bringing countries back into compliance.  Potential solutions will 
often arise outside the well-defined boundaries of the hard law of treaties. Solutions require 
better recognition, understanding, and response to socio-historic contexts.  Investments in 
collaborative research and development for innovative verification regimes are also critical.  
Such solutions can allow diplomacy to be more flexible than hard law solutions can in building 
trust and capacity. In an international environment inexorably moving toward multilateralism, 
investment and build-up of institutional capacity in compliance and verification regimes will 
foster from necessary --- trust, certainty, and fairness for sustainable levels of compliance. 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
 
Most understand treaties in their literal and direct sense. Beth Simmons posits one usable 
baseline definition: "A treaty is a formal agreement between sovereign states, usually 
documented in writing...(and) one of the oldest forms of communications among sovereigns   
crucial as documents for conducting international relations...(which) generally create legal 
obligations among states that are parties to them.”1  This general idea of what constitutes a treaty 
provides the predominant device and mechanism for individual countries to interact with one 
another with at least some modicum of certainty. 
Treaties have undoubtedly been relied upon historically as one of the main vehicles for 
increased international cooperation.  How one perceives a treaty can be shaped by a multitude of 
factors.  Treaties can undoubtedly be seen as expressions of norms and values. Such a view can 
be quite useful in explaining why some parties might be more likely to violate treaty agreements.   
                                                          
1
 Simmons, Beth Ann, “Treaty Compliance and Violation,” Annual Review of Political Science 
13, no. 1 (2010): 1-2. (accessed 17 December 2017); available from https://dash.harvard.edu/ 
handle/1/11665828 
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Compliance is a key component of treaties.  Making sure parties to a treaty actually do 
what they have agreed to do is a critical issue in treaty formation.  All treaties are, to varying 
degrees, “obligation-creating legal instruments.”2  The stringency of a specific treaty obligations 
depend, in part, on the language utilized in the treaty.  In mandatory language (“must”) would 
create far more obligation for a party than hortatory language (“should” or “ought”), and the 
decision to employ mandatory or hortatory language in a treaty ultimately reflects a preference 
for mandatory “hard law” requirements or the less stringent, hortatory “soft law”.3  These kinds 
of law will be discussed subsequently.  
Reasons for a state’s noncompliance can sometimes be quite rational, albeit illegal.  
Similarly, individual parties can often develop (either in treaty formation or over time) different 
ideas about what treaty compliance looks like and their obligations under the agreement.   
Any number of variables can impact a country’s ability and willingness to comply, and 
bringing a country back into compliance requires commitment to increasing knowledge bases, 
capacity, and the necessary tools.   
Perhaps the only certainty with a party’s noncompliance is the uncertainty which it 
creates. When a party to an international arms treaty fails to comply, the uncertainty of the non-
violating parties as to the measure and degree of non-compliance inexorably leads to uncertainty 
in how best to respond.  If noncompliance continues unabated, confidence and trust between 
treaty parties as well as non-parties will erode.  This creates even greater uncertainty about future 
viability of international agreements.   
 This cycle of uncertainty would be untenable under any type of international agreement, 
but it takes on added significance and urgency in the context of international arms treaties and 
                                                          
2
 Ibid., 2 
3
 Ibid., pps. 3-6. 
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nuclear nonproliferation.  In these specific contexts, uncertainty about a country’s level of 
noncompliance and subsequent uncertainty about an appropriate response can lead to 
disproportionately bad outcomes.  Nuclear war, large scale military operations, and scores of 
civilian deaths could reasonably be imagined as likely consequences when treaty noncompliance 
is not effectively addressed and uncertainty dominates the discourse. Themes to bring nations 
into compliance are as below. 
1.More investment in multilateral treaties…. 
The international community cannot afford to take a wait-and-see approach in addressing 
noncompliance issues and non-compliant parties.  To tackle this problem of noncompliance, 
more investment into multilateral treaties could produce the desired outcome between nation 
states. Better recognition of socio-historical context can help underwrite the treaty to where a 
country does not feel its sovereignty is disrespected. Every country wants to feel equal on the 
world stage; showing immediate signs of disrespect are non-conversation starters and would 
hinder any would be compliance in agreed upon treaty. Treaties come to fruition because there is 
mutual ground for agreement and it would benefit both sides. Supporting movement of 
multilateralism and facilitating broader international involvement will help validate mutual 
compliance. Having means of compliance and verification built into the treaty are highly critical.  
2. Determining the political personality of the nation state in treaties 
George F. Kennan’s “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” begins with a discussion of aspects 
that shape the “political personality” of power.  Kennan ultimately sees the Soviet “political 
personality” as contingent on two things: ideology and circumstances.4   
                                                          
4
 Kennan, George F. “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.”  Foreign Affairs 25, no. 4 (1947): 566-82 
(accessed 17 December 2017); available from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ 
articles/russian-federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct 
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 While Kennan solely focused on the Soviet Union, his method can be readily imported 
into the process parties to a treaty use to bring a country back into compliance.  Even though the 
four countries in this report likely have distinctly unique sets of political personality drivers, the 
recognition of this importance in tailoring solutions can have almost universal applicability. 
3. The difficulties in determining compliance center on the nature of the treaty 
In order to bring sovereign nations back into compliance with treaty agreements we must 
first understand the meaning of a treaty.  Individual understanding of these meanings of treaties 
will differ to varying degrees.  Even how a treaty establishes verification processes impacts how 
the parties view compliance.  
Beyond the understanding of what a treaty is we must ask ourselves what it means to be 
compliant and if our understanding of compliance is consistent with that of other nations and the 
treaty itself. The United States must consider possibilities of rational non-compliance. 
4. Understanding Hard Law versus Soft Law is critical 
The United States must also consider the costs and benefits and the tradeoffs in 
implementing hard law solutions like treaties versus more flexible, easier-to-implement soft law 
solutions. Hard law refers to the actual binding legal instruments of law. Soft law refers to 
guidelines and policy declarations or codes of conduct. However, they are not directly 
enforceable. 
Hard law may elicit a much higher cost than the benefits it produces whereas soft law 
may elicit many of the benefits of hard law at a much lower cost.  If countries are reluctant to 
commit to a course of conduct in a situation where the future is uncertain then soft laws may 
provide them with a means to commit without the biding legal agreement to do so regardless of 
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what the future may hold. In this way, soft law may be better suited to the interests of both strong 
and weak states.  
5. Finding a common ground for each treaty in non-compliance using energy  
 The United States will have to find common ground with each non-complying country 
respectively. One area of interest the United States can look at in an effort to find common 
ground is the pursuit into the distribution, storage and production of energy. Energy is important 
to each nation in non-compliance in this study. With Iran, it brought them to the table and the 
elimination of coal supplies to North Korea might do the same. 
6. Using international organizations to assist in treaty compliance 
 In order for the United States to multilateral relationships with other countries “it is important 
that international organizations understand how to encourage participation in dispute resolution. 
International organizations can coordinate international interactions to increase the likelihood 
that states will submit to the authority of dispute resolution bodies." 
5
 
7.Using information sharing and transparency to assist in bring compliance 
An information sharing program can also aid in the United States’ effort in improving 
transparency in treaties. Transparency is a vital building block in the pursuit of trust. If the 
United States can partner with international third-party programs such as the UN or the IAEA to 
develop an information sharing program that can distribute transparent and informative data on 
the current state of nuclear non-proliferation around the world to citizens of non-compliant 
countries then it is possible that the citizens may begin to have a more rounded understanding of 
                                                          
5
U.S. Legal.Com, "Soft Law and Legal Definition, from https://definitions.uslegal.com/s/soft-law    
and Guzman, Andrew,  “International Organizations and the Frankenstein Problem,”  The European  
Journal of International Law 24, no. 4 (2013): 999-1025 (accessed 17 December 2017); available from 
https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article/24/4/999/606374 
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the situation at hand and may then seek to regulate its country’s actions from a domestic level. 
Many countries seek to direct the domestic narrative of international treaties at their population.    
8. Finding an agreed verification process is critical to treaty compliance  
Verification is arguably one of the most important processes in achieving sustainable compliance 
goals.  The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) states that 
“verification will play a central role in establishing and sustaining nuclear armament 
agreements.”6  Former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn—who during his tenure shepherded the “Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program” which stresses the centrality of verification in 
achieving an effective and sustainable compliance regime. He cites factors which foster this as 
certainty, trust, and confidence not only with countries whose activities are being verified but 
with non-possessing states and even non-parties:      
When nuclear weapons or materials are involved, that lack of 
confidence undermines global security and can derail or stall the 
momentum of arms reduction or other nuclear threat reduction 
efforts.  In short, verification can serve as the brake or the engine 
for arms control, and much greater capacity and participation a 
needed now and in the future for long term success.
7
   
 
 As stated above, successfully bringing a country back into compliance depends on every 
party agreeing what compliance looks like.   
           Verification can be defined as “a set of national and cooperative activities, tools, 
procedures, analytical processes, and fundamentally, judgments about what is happening with 
                                                          
6
Verification Research, Training and Information Centre, “The IAEA and Nuclear Disarmament  
Verification: A Primer,” Verification Matters, no. 11 (2015).  (accessed 17 December 2017); available from 
http://www.vertic.org/media/assets/Publications/VM11%20WEB.pdf 
 
7
Nuclear Threat Initiative, Innovating Verification: New Tools & New Actors to Reduce Nuclear  
Risks: Overview (Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative 2014) (accessed 17 December 2017); available from 
http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/VPP_Overview_FINAL.pdf?_=1405445582 and  Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Program, https://www.csis.org/people/sam-nunn 
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regard to specific activities defined in an agreement.”8  VERTIC provides a similar functional 
definition: “Verification is the process of gathering and analyzing information to make a 
judgement about parties’ compliance with an agreement.”9   
These issues seem to arise from the partial political character of verification:   
Each state, given its political and security situation, has to make its 
own judgment on what is the adequate verification of a given 
treaty or agreement.  This could lead to, and has led to, situations 
where states have arrived at different judgements on the adequacy 
of the verification system for a particular treaty.
10
  
       
Verification’s subjectivity problem has been, and still is, a major issue in assessing available 
evidence and making compliance determinations.  A specific example is Iran which agreed to the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) along with the U.S., Russia, the United Kingdom, 
and Germany. Iran’s continued development of a ballistic missile program established the 
predicate for U.S. decertification of the agreement.  This led to the U.S. argument that Iran is 
violating the spirit of the agreement even though the IAEA continues to certify Iran’s 
compliance with the letter of agreement based on U.N. Resolutions cited in the JCPOA.
11
   
                                                          
8
Nuclear Threat Initiative, Innovating Verification, 5. 
              
9
Verification Research, Training and Information Centre, “The IAEA and Nuclear Disarmament,” 13. 
 
10
Dahlman, Ola, “Verification: To Detect, To Deter and To Build Confidence,”  
In Disarmament forum: Arms Control Verification, no. 3, ed. Jane Linekar, 3-13 (Geneva: United Nations Institute 
for Disarmament Research, 2010) (accessed 17 December 2017); available from 
http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/arms-control-verification-en-320.pdf 
 
 
11
Council on Foreign Relations, The Impact of the Iran Nuclear Agreement (accessed 17  
December 2017); available from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/impact-iran-nuclear-agreement 
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Increased U.S. investment in developing better verification methods could help nuclear 
inspectors with problems of trying to “prove the negative” in a situation where a country might 
withhold from their required baseline disclosures.
12
   
RUSSIA 
Situation: 
INF Treaty 
"The Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist 
Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF 
Treaty)" is a bilateral agreement of unlimited duration between the U.S. and Russia (Soviet 
Union) that required the destruction of both countries’ “ground-launched ballistic and cruise 
missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, their launchers and associated support 
structures and support equipment within three years after the Treaty enters into force” and barred 
the production of any INF proscribed missiles in the future as long as both countries remained 
party to the treaty.  The INF Treaty entered into force on June 1, 1988.  In May, 1991, both 
countries eliminated the last of their respective missiles declared under the INF Treaty.  The INF 
Treaty remains in force.
13
 Regrettably compliance does not. 
New START 
The Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on 
Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) 
represents the most recent iteration of arms reduction treaty between the U.S. and Russia.  New 
START establishes a total aggregate limit to U.S. and Russian strategic arms that must be met by 
                                                          
12
 Ibid., Council on Foreign Relations. 
13
 U.S. Department of State,  Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of  
Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF 
Treaty) (accessed 17 December 2017); available from https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm 
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February 8, 2018.  New START entered into force on February 5, 2011, and its duration is 10 
years unless superseded by a subsequent agreement.
14
   
Most significantly in July of 2014, the Department of State determined “that the Russian 
Federation is in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or 
flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 
km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.”15   
Challenges and Issues: 
Russia’s continued noncompliance with the INF Treaty can be placed in the larger 
context of Russian brinksmanship abroad.  Russian incursions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Crimea, 
as well as its program of disrupting elections show a Russia taking more risks and behaving more 
erratically. Syria and the Middle East can also be thrown into this equation.  
Putin’s Leadership 
Russia’s risky international behavior can be seen as a direct product of Vladimir Putin’s 
leadership.  Though Russia certainly deserves to be involved as a major stakeholder in finding 
solutions for modern-day nuclear problems, Putin’s choices and his penchant for brinksmanship 
and creating chaos on the world stage have significantly diminished Russia’s viability as an 
international partner. 
Anti-Western Sentiment 
There is usually not a lot of moving forward with any issue that is brought to the table 
where the United States and Russia sit on opposing heads. With recent events, there is not a lot 
                                                          
14
 U.S. Department of State, New START (accessed 17 December 2017); available from  
https://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/ 
 
15
U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation,  
and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, July, 2014 (accessed 17 December 2017); available from 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/230108.pdf 
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of hope of improvement either. “From an historical perspective, two challenges have been 
making U.S.-Russia cooperative relations difficult. One challenge has to do with the actions of 
both sides. The other challenge involves how they describe what is going on in their relations.”16 
This does not mean all hope is lost; it means US and Russia need to find common interests they 
can come to an agreement on and mutual trust can be fostered.   
The strategic outcome with these negotiations is the New START treaty is due to expire 
in 2021.  Those two historical and previous challenges mentioned above play a major role with 
those new proceedings. “The first (practical) challenge is that the United States and Russia have 
found it difficult or unnecessary to signal mutual intentions and have maintained uncertainty 
about those intentions. The second challenge to the U.S.-Russia relationship is epistemological. 
It has to do with the misuse of concepts to describe their conflict. The problem is the analytical 
impasse. 
17
 
One of the other big concerns the United States and Russia face, is neither country wants 
to decrease the number of nuclear weapons they have. “In the nearly six decades since the advent 
of nuclear arms control, virtually all negotiated agreements to limit stockpiles of nuclear 
weapons have been concluded by the United States and Russia Federation. Even today the U.S. 
and Russian arsenals are many times larger than those of other nuclear weapons states.”18  In 
2007, Russia voiced their concerns with reducing their amount of intermediate range missiles 
because; other European nations were acquiring them as well. China, North Korea, India, 
                                                          
16
 Troitskiy, Mikail. “Two Challenges to U.S.-Russia Relations: Ontological and Epistemological”   
PONARS Eurasia. Accessed 17  December 2017.  Available from http://www.ponarseurasia.org/article/two-
challenges-us-russia-relations-ontological-and-epistemological 
 
17
 Troitskiy, Mikail. 
18
 Tyson, James L., and Steven Pifer, “Nuclear Arms Control Beyond the U.S. and Russia,” 
Brookings, August 29, 2016. (accessed 17 December 2017);  available from https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-
from-chaos/2016/08/29/nuclear-arms-control-beyond-the-u-s-and-russia/ 
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Pakistan, Iran, and Israel were acquiring the intermediate range missiles; all closer proximity to 
Russia than the United States. 
19
 
Current Actions: 
 Economic sanctions have been placed on Russia for their territorial incursions and for 
interference with the U.S. 2016 General Election. President Obama applied sanctions on Russia 
through four executive orders in March 2014 after Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and 
Ukrainian incursions.  The Russian Federation threatened Ukraine's peace, security, stability, 
sovereignty, and territorial integrity.
20
 The U.S. Senate also passed legislation that codifies the 
Obama administration’s executive orders in law and requires Congressional approval or a 
presidential waiver before sanctions can be lifted.
21
  This legislation also authorizes additional 
sanctions on Russia. 
Recommendations: 
 As the world’s two largest nuclear powers, the United States and Russia have a unique 
role to play, and in the best interest of both countries to constrain any nuclear buildup or 
proliferation.
22
  Both countries share a long history of shared norms in this realm, and this can be 
built upon again.  
                                                          
19
 Pifer, Steven, “How to get Moscow Back to Compliance with the INF Treaty,” Brookings. April  
26, 2017.  (accessed 16 December 2017); available from https://www.brookings.edu/ 
blog/order-from-chaos/2017/04/26/how-to-get-moscow-back-to-compliance-with-inf-treaty/ 
 
20
 Pifer, Steven. “Order from Chaos: Trump, Russia, and Sanctions.” Brookings.  June 27, 2017.  
Accessed 16 December 2017.  Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/06/27/trump-
russia-and-sanctions/ 
21
 Pifer, Steven. “Order from Chaos.” 
22
 Nuclear Threat Initiative. Innovating Verification: New Tools & New Actors to Reduce Nuclear  
Risks: Overview. Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2014.  Accessed 16 December 2017.  Available from 
http://www.nti.org/media/pdfsVPP_Overview_FINAL.pdf?_=1405445582 
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1. Stress communication and collaboration among stakeholders, which work to foster 
trust and cooperation as recommended by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) working group.      
Particularly in the case of Russia, there seems to be a lack of understanding between the United 
States and Russia of the soft-law norms that are currently animating each respective country’s 
ideas of nonproliferation and reductions; which are embodied in the hard law of treaties. 
Understanding the soft-law norms is critical to establishing new verification protocols and 
fostering compliance.
23
  Similarly, the U.S. Department of Defense task force report outlines a 
four-phase proposal which includes: 
2) Expanding bilateral cooperative developments/evaluations with P-5 + 1states;  
3) Extending the development/evaluations to all nuclear weapon states; 
4) Engaging major nations that employ nuclear power generation;  
5) Evolving from bilateral to multilateral implementation;  
6) Engaging in both hard law and soft law. 
This report encourages dialogue and the establishment of common soft-law norms among the 
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. This places a focus on a movement 
from bilateralism to multilateralism, which has been a desire in constructing new 
nonproliferation agreements.
24
  
In order to understand the shifting norms underlying Russia’s motivations, the United 
States should first seek to create constructive dialogue that can both help deescalate hostility as 
well as map out areas of common interest in which trust can be built. A key example where 
                                                          
23
 Nuclear Threat Initiative. Innovating Verification. 
24
 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Science Board. Task Force Report: Assessment of Nuclear  
Monitoring and Verification.  Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014. Accessed 16 December 2017.  
Available from https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/Assessment_of_Nuclear_Monitoring_ 
and_Verification_Technologies.pdf 
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constructive dialogue can be used is working to understand Russia’s interpretation of NATO’s 
expansion toward its borders. Constructive dialogue in this area might not immediately resolve 
the issues, but it can certainly help to build rapport between the United States and Russia.
25
 Tools 
that increase engagement and promote multilateralism, research, and dialogue could be the best 
means to reengage both countries in nonproliferation process and build an environment of trust. 
It is our recommendation any model “should engage with both hard law enforcement 
remedies in tandem with soft law management methods.”26  As Williamson noted, “recognition 
and clear understanding of soft-law norms that animate both countries’ ideas of non-proliferation 
and nuclear armament reductions contained in the hard law of the treaties is key to finding 
intersection bringing Russia back into compliance under the INF treaty”. Working toward soft-
law agreements between the United States and Russia that do not necessarily need ratification 
from the U.S. Senate or the Russian Duma can be beneficial, as the ratification process can often 
work against the agreement. Using such agreements, however, requires the United States to 
clearly define what it is willing to work with Russia on remedying and what it will not tolerate.  
The United States and a diverse collection of other countries, whether they have nuclear 
weapons or not, need to convince Russia violating the treaties set forth will not benefit them 
more than abiding by the rules; as “the military and political costs of continuing to violate the 
treaty outweigh whatever gains the Russian military hopes to achieve.”27  According to the NTI, 
in order to manage and mitigate those threats, countries around the world need to continue to 
increase the nuclear material and weapons verification systems. The United States’ efforts must 
                                                          
25
 Nuclear Threat Initiative. Innovating Verification. 
26
 Williamson, Jr., Richard L. “Hard-law, Soft-law, and Non-law in Multilateral Arms Control:  
Some Compliance Hypotheses.” Chicago Journal of International Law 4, no. 1 (2003): 59-82. Accessed 16 
December 2017.  Available from http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol4/iss1/7/ 
27
 Pifer, Steven. “How to get Moscow Back to Compliance with the INF Treaty.” 
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go beyond incremental improvements of traditional approaches to monitoring, as it is no longer 
enough to monitor from treaty and agreement dictates for “point”  compliance to the number and 
types formally agreed upon and geographically bounded.
28
 
The need for comprehensive monitoring, or addressing the problem as a whole, is 
particularly important as military and civilian nuclear applications are connected, in part through 
the global nuclear science and technology base.  If the United States is to understand and 
effectively monitor part of such a global interconnected enterprise, it must understand it as a part 
of the whole. Understanding the whole means that the United States must monitor the whole, and 
the Assessment points out that not all that monitoring can be carried out through methods 
negotiated in treaties. Non-negotiated, “general purpose” monitoring will have to complement 
the negotiated monitoring for a particular treaty.
29
  The Defense Science Board Assessment also 
states that one size will not fit all, and the United States must pay attention to details such as 
geography, access, and suspected stage of proliferation, when creating a strategy for monitoring.  
 
SYRIA 
Current Situation: 
The current situation in Syria that the rest of the world is dealing with concerns the 
country’s ongoing and continued usage of chemical weapons in their civil war. Most countries in 
the world have signed treaties that require them to not use, harbor, or aid any type 
of chemical weapons. Syria happens to be one of the countries. However, it is a different matter 
that Syria does not follow the rules and regulations set by these treaties. Despite signing multiple 
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treaties about the production, testing, and usage of chemical weapons, Syria continues to use and 
distribute these weapons to this day.   
There are a few key players behind Syria’s continued usage of these weapons. The 
President of Syria, Bashar al-Assad, has been calculated to be the one who encourages the 
creation and the usage of these weapons. Assad has been harboring chemical weapons in his 
country, even after signing the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2013.  Some of the other 
treaties that Syria has signed include the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which was signed in 
1968 and prevents the spread of nuclear weapons, as well as promoting cooperation in the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy; the Biological Weapons Convention was signed by Syria in 
1972 and it works to outlaw biological arms; Syria also signed the International Convention for 
the Suppression of Acts of Terrorism in 2005, which is designed to outlaw acts of nuclear 
terrorism and support police and judicial cooperation to prevent, investigate, and punish those 
acts.   
After Syria signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2013, all Syrian chemical 
weapons were supposedly destroyed by the OPCW-UN Joint Mission. However, shortly after, 
Syria was accused of having a Ricin chemical weapons program was still in effect. Assad’s 
administration claimed that it had fallen into the hands of the Syrian Opposition forces.  Syria 
once again claimed that it had an additional four hidden chemical weapons programs. 
Issues and Challenges: 
Syria has been suspected of harboring biological weapons Syria believes it provides 
security and benefits; instead it represents a path to isolation and intense scrutiny from the global 
community. President Bashar al-Assad has been in denial of all these allegations.  
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The US finds itself in a cautious and difficult position. While the US is opposed to the 
Assad regime, it must remain attentive to defeating ISIS in Syria which it has.  
Russia finds comfort using the Assad regime as a buffer against Sunni backed chemical 
weapons getting into the Caucasus. Putin will never change his position here. Iran has multiple 
stakes in Syrian stability…non-Sunni as well. Syria is where the Russians can hope to have a 
presence in the region and a return to their former world leadership role. Without Syria 
assistance, Iran is going to have major difficulties supplying Hezbollah with weaponry and 
supplies in their Sunni fight there.  
Current Actions: 
Syria is in a complex civil war. There are many actors participating in a variety of ways. 
Russia is propping up the Assad regime to protect their global interest. Iran is using their proxy 
group Hezbollah to grab for power in the region, ISIS is using the disarray of the country to plant 
their capitol, and Untied States are there to go after ISIS and Assad for his use of chemical 
weapons on his own people.  
The destruction can be generalized with the mass exodus of the Syrian population to 
outlying countries. At Syria’s peak population, it held roughly 20 million people (Population, 
Total, 2017). Shortly after the civil war started in 2011 the population started to leave the country 
to neighboring locations. The population started to rise in Iraq and Lebanon; Lebanon is home to 
Hezbollah. Hezbollah is a proxy terrorist organization. The common fear is that these refuges 
will radicalize to the Hezbollah flavor of extremism. To combat this global crisis, a global 
solution is needed. Countries from all around the world have come together to give humanitarian 
assistance to Syria. United States has giver over 7 billion dollars, Japan has contributed $852.7 
million in assistance, and has Jordan given over $100 million (USAID, 2017).  
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Four Cease fire zones have been established in Syria. One along the southern border, one 
on the north-west border, and one between Hama, and Homs, another one in eastern Ghouta 
(Syria war). Such deals were due to diplomacy; assuring an end to this war will be diplomatic 
solution and not a military one. “President Trump and President Putin confirmed the importance 
of de-escalation areas as an interim step to reduce violence in Syria, enforce ceasefire 
agreements, facilitate unhindered humanitarian access, and set the conditions for the ultimate 
political solution to the conflict.”  Russia, Iran, Turkey, and United States, all came to agreement 
with these resolutions. Russians and Iran, Hezbollah support the Assad regime, and Turkey and 
United States support the rebels.  
Cooperation with other countries and the UN are key to solving the Syrian complex. 
However, Russia on the other hand is critical component. In 2012 Syria stated they had chemical 
weapons. Shortly after there was a chemical attack in Ghouta, where there now is a cease fire 
agreement, and it was assessed that the Assad regime was highly likely of the attack. Russian 
Foreign Minister took Secretary of State John Kerry ad lib comment to heart and convinced 
Syria to turn over all their chemical weapons to the international community.  This was a rare 
occurrence of cooperation from the Assad regime, but they were swayed by Russia to do so.   
On November 11, 2017, President Trump and President Putin agreed to maintain open 
military channels, work towards a diplomatic solution, and maintain Syria’s sovereignty.  The 
ideal solution is, “…full implementation of UNSCR 2254, including constitutional reform and 
free and fair elections under UN supervision, held to the highest international standards of 
transparency, with all Syrians, including members of the diaspora, eligible to participate.” 
Millions of Syrians are displaced by violent extremism. Humanitarian aid key to help 
those are displaced. Cease fires are working to get refugees back into their home country. 
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Cooperation with the international community will get a diplomatic solution in place. Regarding 
the Syria Civil War and its five organized sides of opposition, the loser is the people of Syria. 
With what has happened to them, this is a War where no tears are left. 
Recommendations:  
1. Recommendation one is to force Syria back into compliance would be to change the leader 
and some of their government. A method of influencing a nation is to sanction the state. 
Sanctions could include trade embargoes or, as seen in some cases today, targeted sanctions on 
influential politicians and agencies from the offending country (Syria). Such targeted sanctions 
may include cutting off trade, asset freezing, or travel bans. As mentioned before, an 
implementation of UNSCR 2254 with an international force to ensure a safe and just political 
election. The international community must come together and promote Syria as a sovereign 
state rather than a proxy of the Shiite-Sunni War seen in Syrian, Yemen and other countries.  
2. The second recommendation to get Syria back into compliance would be to provide long term 
assistance to help internally displaced persons Syrians and refugees. The assistance would 
provide critical and lifesaving support to millions of displaced persons or those unable to meet 
their basic needs in affected areas of Syria, including through operations across the international 
borders. The contribution would also include emergency food assistance, medical care, and 
shelter and safe drinking water. Providing assistance to ensure compliance will display the 
amount of concern US has for Syria. 
3. The third recommendation is to reduce the influence of the loyalists Syria forces and 
their ability to create and obtain biological and chemical weapons by an increase U.S. influence 
in Syria. This will require some recognition of the Free Syrian Army and a withdrawal of 
Russian and Iranian influence. Connect that with a cease-fire and political agreement to include 
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seams in the zones that were formerly controlled by ISIS filling those by Free Syrian Army 
personnel.  This measure needs to be in concert with the international community.  
IRAN 
Situation: 
 
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is an agreement under the Obama 
Administration reached between Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, 
United States, and Germany).  It “establishes a strong and effective formula for blocking all of 
the pathways by which Iran could acquire material for nuclear weapons and promptly detecting 
and deterring possible efforts by Iran to covertly pursue nuclear weapons in the future.”30  This 
plan sets restrictions on uranium enhancement, plutonian use, and centrifuge…time synched to 
particular site locations as well.  
Under the Obama administration, both Iran and the United States wanted to keep the deal 
in place.  The United States does not want Iran to build functional nuclear weapons, which is the 
reason that the JCPOA was drawn and ratified.  Iran wants to continue with JCPOA because it 
means that the UN sanctions previously levied on Iran, are lifted under the terms of the 
agreement; sanctions Iran wants to make sure remain lifted include those related to “trade, 
technology, finance, and energy” (JCPOA 2).  The JCPOA also stipulates that if it suspects Iran 
is violating the agreement; framers have the authority to withdraw and snapback some sanctions.  
Challenges and Issues 
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 The Iranian economy faces many challenges to include reliance on oil exports for 
government spending, gasoline imports, economic mishandling, inflation, unemployment, 
poverty, and poor domestic policy, external sanctions from the US and the UN, and other US 
financial pressures.
31
  It is known that Iran’s government funding is from oil exports, and quasi-
state actors.
32
  The quasi-state actors are “semi-private charitable Islamic foundations or trusts” 
which hold extensive political power.
33
   
The IRGC is one of these quasi-state actors.
34
  They are a powerful association comprised 
of current and former Iranian leaders.
35
  IRGC military forces have supported Syrian President 
Assad’s regime by sending troops to Iraq and Syria.  The IRGC actions are funded through 
legitimate and illegitimate businesses seeking goods, services, and technology for the program. 
Additionally, the IRGC’s Quds Force, a special unit dedicated protecting Iran’s government, has 
a history of working with various terrorist groups, notably Hezbollah, and the Houthi in Yemen 
and money laundering for Sunni Hamas.
36
 
Current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has a huge impact on Iran and its 
government. The current President of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, is a moderate whose plan is to 
improve the economy through ending international isolation.  To do this, Rouhani needs to keep 
the nuclear deal with the US.   
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President Donald Trump announced on October 13, 2017, his strategy to address the 
rouge nation of Iran.  President Trump accused Iran of “multiple violations of the agreement” 
and “intimidating international inspectors into not using the full inspection authorities” as per the 
agreement.  President Trump announced his decision to not recertify the Iran agreement, but to 
return it to Congress with a timeline to do so or not.  
 This is an important "tempest in a teapot" as Iran in in compliance with the JCPOA. 
Contentious issues concern that before the signing of the JCPOA Iran was barred under UN 
Security Council Resolution 1929 for any work on ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear 
weapons. With the treaty UN Security Council Resolution 2231 promulgates they are called only 
to abstain from this testing which remains within the spirit of the treaty, and the IRGC chooses 
not to do so. This is not a hard law violation. 
Current Actions 
 In July of 2015, under the JCPOA, Iran has discontinued a vast amount of their nuclear 
program’s research and has opened itself up for international regulation and routine inspection 
into its nuclear and military facilities. In return, the United States, United Nations, and the 
European Union have lifted their sanctions on Iran. In accordance with the JCPOA, Iran’s 
uranium stockpile and its ability to enrich it was placed under restriction.
37
  The intent of the 
JCPOA was to delay Iran’s nuclear program, so any decision to sprint toward producing nuclear 
material for a weapon would take at least a year.
38
  Currently, Iran’s enrichment facilities are 
being monitored by the IAEA. Yukiya Amano, IAEA’s director-general, is responsible for 
issuing quarterly reports to the IAEA Board of Governors and also the UN Security Council on 
                                                          
37
 Council on Foreign Relations, The Impact of the Iran Nuclear Agreement (accessed 17  
December 2017).  available from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/impact-iran-nuclear-agreement. 
 
38
 Council on Foreign Relations.  The Impact of the Iran Nuclear Assessment. 
  
27 
 
Iran’s implementation of its nuclear commitments.39  While the U.S. has lifted its sanctions on 
Iranian oil exports, allowing Iran to trade on the international market once again following an 
extensive hiatus, there are still other U.S. sanctions that remain in effect. Specifically, current 
sanctions are restricting financial transactions which have the potential to fine and bar companies 
from trading on Wall Street.
40
  Many officials oppose the JCPOA often cite many of the 
JCPOA’s expiration dates in regard to its nuclear provisions.  The IAEA’s quarterly reports show 
that Iran has maintained compliance with the JCPOA. Early on Iran had twice exceeded the 
amount of heavy water it is allowed under JCPOA requirement but, Iran quickly resolved the 
issue.  Without clear evidence of Iranian noncompliance this would be a breach of the United 
States commitments under the JCPOA. 
Recommendations: 
 1. In order to move forward in future negotiations with Iran it is our recommendation that 
the United States remain in compliance with the JCPOA. While it is important to recognize the 
JCPOA’s weaknesses in regard to its sunset clauses and limitations in verification processes it is 
vital that the United States demonstrates its willingness to uphold an agreement with Iran in 
order to maintain diplomatic leverage in future negotiations.
41
 If the United States choses to 
decertify the JCPOA then it will struggle to gain support from other P5+1 members to use soft 
law management methods in an effort to keep Iran in compliance with nuclear nonproliferation, 
Particularly with China and Germany. 
           2. Leverage China to assist with curtailment of missile testing and Russia as well, one 
regarding trade incentives and the other concerning additional sanctions. 
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 3. If sanctions were to be again placed into effect, it is recommended that the United 
States maintain and continue to impose strict sanctions on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Core and its top-ranking officials in an effort to decrease the funding and training of terrorist 
organizations such as Hezbollah.
42
    
NORTH KOREA 
Situation: 
North Korea is riddled with poverty and viewed as a rogue nation by most of its 
counterparts around the world. On the surface their willingness to build, test and threaten to use 
nuclear weapons has made many nations apprehensive about whether North Korea can be 
trusted. In fact, North Korea withdrew from the Nonproliferation Treaty in which it had resided 
in name only since 1994, in 2003 and has since been rapidly and extensively developing their 
nuclear program since. 
Challenges and Issues: 
North Korea is often defined as a rogue nation when it comes to policy, alliances and 
economy; which is what makes dealing with them difficult. An article written by Youngwon Cho 
in 2014, "Method to the Madness of Chairman Kim: The Instrumental Rationality of North 
Korea’s Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons,” he outlines the major challenges and issues associated 
with North Korea as follows: their economy; the welfare of their citizens; international structures 
in place which have led to anxiety; South Korea; and U.S. military power.
43
  
Economy 
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North Korea has been an international welfare case for some time. That welfare has come 
from China chiefly and from Russia recently. According to Cho, "North Koreas entire annual 
output is generated by South Korea in slightly over nine days.”44  This economic gap between 
North Korea and their southern neighbors has created anxiety about their ability to stand up 
against attack from a neighboring country which has rooted their belief that they should build 
their up their nuclear arsenal.  
Welfare of citizens 
People in North Korea in recent years have literally starved to death. There is not enough 
food or money to provide what they need for their people. With that line of thought North Korea 
must hold a level of control over their population that would prevent anarchy. This makes them 
dangerous to the rest of the world, if they aren’t even sure they have the loyalties of their own 
citizens.  
International Structures in place have led to Anxiety 
It is no secret that the entire world is fundamentally against North Korea developing any 
sort of weapons program. They have been sanctioned many times in the past and discussions are 
taking place with regards to sanctions which should expand if they continue their weapons 
program. With Kim Jung-Un as an unstable leader and possibly irrational also, they feel the need 
to develop nuclear weapons based on this fear of international structures and if pushed hard 
enough, they would most definitely use them.  
South Korea 
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As mentioned previously, North and South Korea were both at one time on level playing 
fields. The United States is aligned with South Korea and there are several bases located in South 
Korea with United States military readily available. The more North Korea feels threatened the 
more developed their nuclear program becomes.  
 Military Power 
When looking at sheer volume and military per capita North Korea resembles a force to 
be reckoned with "heavy armored hardware…numerically equivalent to 10 US armored 
divisions.”45  Couple with the fact their air force is the numerical equivalent to 6 US wings it is 
easy to be concerned. Realistically, their actual capabilities are far less than they are given credit 
for. North Korea does not have a readily capable ground fighting force to sustain long and 
enduring military campaign.  Simply put, they do not have the force structure to impose their will 
on the enemy for sustained campaigns. They choose to place their vision into using nuclear 
weapons program to hold counterweight on international structures. 
 Current Actions: 
There are many sanctions on North Korea from various countries and organizations. 
Sanctions are having a desired effect but they find a way around them through underground 
economies. In early November 2017, China increased the amount and severity of sanctions 
against North Korea regarding finance and banking. Currently Beijing has reported they are 
complying with UN sanctions against North Korea.  
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Recommendations: 
 
              1. It is recommended the U.S. should offer significant economic aid and security 
assurance if North Korea dismantles her nuclear program.  The United States should send 
economic and humanitarian aid.
46
  North Korea should provide definitive proof of ending their 
nuclear weapons program.  This would be imperative of future compliance and verification 
measures.  
            2. As a showing of good faith, we recommend that lifting current sanctions/bans on: 
statue, coal, mineral, iron, seafood, textile exports, and caps on North Korean labor exports. 
 3. Leverage China and Russia to freeze development of the North Korean program via 
China sanctioning coal; and Russia ceasing trading through Vladivostok. Trade agreements 
regarding China are recommended for leverage; and sanctioning selected oligarchs for Russia.  
 “North Korea is dependent on China as a key benefactor, both in terms of diplomatic and 
economic support. North Korea also maintains friendly relations with Russia, although the 
relationship is not as robust as North Korea’s relations with China."47 
  4. “The most realistic U.S. strategy for countering North Korea's exploitation of 
geostrategic divisions and halting its sprint toward nuclear development is to close the gaps with 
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allies and neighbors of North Korea.”48  This means a nuclear South Korea and possibly a 
nuclear Japan.  
 5. Lastly, probably the most unlikely of the options would be to relent and allow North 
Korea to develop weapons. In concert with this would be security agreements in hard law with 
several multinational signers, including the U.S. and North Korea. 
This should show that the international community, namely the US, is serious about re-
integrating North Korea as a compliant state. It should use soft power and engage both allies and 
some adversaries…in hard law and soft law.  
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